BNCCORP INC BNCC
February 17, 2017 - 11:58pm EST by
ladera838
2017 2018
Price: 25.80 EPS 0 0
Shares Out. (in M): 3 P/E 0 0
Market Cap (in $M): 89 P/FCF 0 0
Net Debt (in $M): 0 EBIT 0 0
TEV ($): 89 TEV/EBIT 0 0

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Description

Investment Thesis

I recommend a long position in BNCCORP, Inc. (BNCC) at the current price of $25.80. I believe it likely that BNCC will be sold to a larger bank over the next 12 to 24 months, at a price 25% to 100% higher than the current price. An activist investor with prior experience in this sector is pushing for board representation and a sale of the company. BNCC is too small and inefficient to be viable as an independent bank in the long term, and an event will probably occur within the next couple of years. (Note: BNCC is a small-cap stock, with a market-cap of $89 million, and is best suited for small funds and PAs.)

Background

BNCC is a Bismarck, North Dakota-based community bank with 16 branches (operating as BNC National Bank) in North Dakota, Arizona, and Minnesota. It also conducts mortgage banking operations in those three states, and in Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, and Missouri. The bank was founded in 1987. Gregory Cleveland, co-founder, was President/CEO of the bank from 1995 until his death in 2013. He was succeeded by the current CEO, Timothy Franz, who was previously CFO. The second co-founder, Tracy Scott, is chairman of the board.

BNCC’s lending focus is to small and mid-sized businesses, as opposed to retail lending or to large companies. At the end of 2016, only about 14% of its $414 million of loans held for investment were consumer loans; the balance was business loans. The bank also provides mortgage banking and wealth management services. On the deposit side, the bank has a very low-cost base of core deposits. Approximately 75% of deposits and 66% of loans are in North Dakota, and North Dakota’s economy is dependent on the energy and agricultural markets. Arizona is its next largest market, and Minnesota is the smallest of its key markets.

Financial Performance

The bank had its share of troubles in the financial crisis, but has bounced back strongly since then. The bank took $21 million from the Treasury in 2009 by issuing preferred stock; it was paying 9% on this preferred stock. The preferred was redeemed in 2015 using a combination of cash on hand and $10 million of borrowings (at 6.35%).

Performance in recent years has been decent. In each of the last four years, net income (to common shareholders) has been about $7 million, or about $2.00 per share. ROE has ranged between 10% and 15% recently, and ROA between 0.78% and 1.07%.

SUMMARY INCOME STATEMENT ($000)

2016

2015

2014

2013

 Interest Income

 29,346

 27,915

 29,264

 23,706

 Interest Expense

 (3,343)

 (2,570)

 (3,308)

 (3,861)

 Net Interest Income

 26,003

 25,345

 25,956

 19,845

 Provision for Credit Losses

 (800)

 400

 800

 (700)

 Non-Interest Income

 25,777

 24,950

 20,454

 29,285

 Non-Interest Expense

 (41,193)

 (37,544)

 (34,683)

 (35,981)

 Profit before Taxes

 9,787

 13,151

 12,527

 12,449

 Income Taxes

 (2,631)

 (3,945)

 (4,071)

 (3,822)

 Net Income

 7,156

 9,206

 8,456

 8,627

 Preferred Stock dividends

 -  

 (1,656)

 (1,796)

 (1,320)

 Net Income to Common Sh/h

 7,156

 7,550

 6,660

 7,307

         

 Avg diluted shares O/S (000s)

 3,521

 3,498

 3,491

 3,468

 EPS diluted

 $2.03

 $2.16

 $1.91

 $2.11

         

Efficiency Ratio

79.55%

74.65%

74.73%

73.24%

         

Net Interest Margin

3.03%

2.96%

3.07%

2.65%

Return on Common Equity

10.35%

12.21%

12.37%

15.15%

ROAA

0.78%

1.01%

0.94%

1.07%

 

SUMMARY BALANCE SHEET ($MM)

2016

2015

2014

2013

 Loans Outstanding

 446

 422

 399

 341

 Investment Sec Avail for Sale

 400

 419

 449

 436

 Other Assets

 64

 63

 86

 66

   Total Assets

 910

 904

 934

 843

         

 Deposits

 753

 780

 811

 723

 Other liabilities

 84

 55

 40

 50

 Preferred Stock--9%

 -  

 -  

 21

 21

 Shareholders' Equity (common)

 74

 69

 62

 49

   Total Liabilities & Sh/h Equity

 910

 904

 934

 843

         

 Shares outstanding (millions)

 3.46

 3.43

 3.41

 3.37

         

 TBV/share

 $21.47

 $20.12

 $18.28

 $14.45

         

NPL/Total Loans

0.54%

0.15%

0.02%

1.77%

 

Regional Economy

 

 

 

About 66% of the bank’s outstanding loans are in North Dakota, and thus vulnerable to the state of the regional economy. The region has prospered in recent years as a result of the oil and gas drilling boom in the Baaken oil fields. With about 75% of the bank’s deposits and two-thirds of its loans originating in ND, a prolonged period of depressed energy prices would hurt the bank. Only 2.4% of total loans held for investment are for E&P in ND, but the ripple effects of an energy downturn would have a greater impact on the bank’s financial performance.

Note: I couldn’t find a chart that also included 2016 statistics. But looking at tables with monthly production data, 2016 production decreased by approximately 10-15% from 2015 levels.

(Source: https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf)

 

 

Activist Investor

Without a catalyst, there would be little to get excited about with this bank. Relative to other small publicly traded banks, it seems fairly priced at 1.2x TBV and about 12x earnings. However, with the presence of a credible activist shareholder as catalyst, the stock is potentially cheap. Rangeley Capital, a Connecticut-based hedge fund and a long-time shareholder, owns just under 6% of BNCC, and is pushing for a sale of the company. After failing to get the board to act last year, Rangeley made a public statement at the end of October asking the board to explore “all strategic alternatives” and to add an independent director with a significant stake in the company to assist in the process.

http://seekingalpha.com/article/4017284-rangeley-capital-calls-full-review-strategic-alternatives-bncc

Rangeley was previously involved in behind-the-scenes activism with OBA Financial (OBAF) and Ocean Shore Financial (OSHC), both of which were subsequently sold. They have stated that they will “continue to review all options for maximizing the bank’s value, including running an alternative slate of directors at the next annual meeting.” Given Rangeley’s prior experiences, I believe that they are likely to ultimately succeed in having the bank sold.

Valuation

Why would another bank be attracted to BNCC, and what might it be willing to pay?

Aside from a desire to become bigger and expand its footprint, I can think of at least three reasons why another bank would be interested in acquiring BNCC:

 

 (1)  Low-cost deposit base: Typical of a community bank, BNCC has a very low cost for its deposits. Of its total deposits of $753 million, about 20% are non-interest bearing, with the remainder costing less than 0.4% last year. This deposit base would clearly be attractive to a larger acquirer. That said, the benefits of these low-cost deposits should already be reflected in the bank’s current earnings, and in the stock price.

 

 (2)  Potential cost savings: Like most smaller banks, BNCC has a very high expense structure, as reflected in its efficiency ratio. In 2016 the ratio was almost 80%; the previous year was almost 75%.

Non-Interest Expense ($000)

 

 

 

2016

2015

 Salaries & Employee Benefits

 21,432

 19,692

 Professional Services

 4,581

 3,923

 Data Processing Fees

 3,666

 3,059

 Marketing & Promotion

 3,798

 3,523

 Occupancy

 2,160

 1,981

 Regulatory

 675

 696

 D&A

 1,519

 1,415

 Other

 3,362

 3,255

   Total Non-Interest Expense

 41,193

 37,544

 

 

 

Efficiency Ratio

79.55%

74.65%

 

There should be potential for significant cost savings for a larger bank that acquired BNCC. The amount of the savings will of course depend on multiple factors, including the overlap of the acquirer’s footprint with that of BNCC. I’m not a banking specialist, but the reports I’ve seen suggest that non-interest expenses can be reduced by between 10% and 20% (which in this case would mean an efficiency ratio of between 64% and 72% for BNCC as part of a larger bank, using 2016’s ratio of almost 80%), and perhaps even more than 20%. This would imply potential cost savings of between $4.1 million and $8.2 million.

 (3)  Underutilized assets: At the end of 2016, the bank was classified as “well-capitalized,” with a total risk-based capital ratio of 18.41% (vs. a requirement of 10% to be considered well-capitalized), and Tier 1 RBC of 17.16% (vs. 8% to be well-capitalized). BNCC’s asset structure is unusual in that a very large portion is in investment securities, earning low returns. At the end of 2016, the bank had $910 million in total assets. Of this, $415 million was in loans held for investment, and $400 million in investment securities available for sale. In 3Q2016, the loans earned an average rate of 4.72%, while the investments yielded about 2.1%. (4Q and full year 2016 data is not yet available, but the numbers will be similar.) So there is the potential to deploy the assets to earn higher returns. My guess is that a more aggressive bank could potentially earn an incremental 100-150 bps on the $400 million investment portfolio, generating an additional $4 to $6 million of interest income.

 

Below is an estimate of what BNCC earnings could look like if an acquirer is able to generate the magnitude of cost savings and additional interest income that I’ve discussed above:

2016

 LOW

 HIGH

 Actual income before income taxes

 9,787

 9,787

 Potential cost savings

 4,119

 8,239

 Incremental interest income

 4,000

 6,000

 Pro forma pre-tax income

 17,906

 24,026

 Pro-forma net inc (35% tax rate)

 11,639

 15,617

 Diluted shares outstanding

 3.521

 3.521

 Pro-forma EPS

 $3.31

 $4.44

Assuming that my assumptions for cost savings and incremental revenue are reasonable, it’s not hard to imagine an acquirer paying a multiple of at least 10x on the pro-forma EPS, or at least $33 to $44 per share.

I’m not a big fan of P/BV valuations. That said, I assume the bank should get at least 1.5x TBV, and possibly over 2x. With TBV at $21.47 at the end of 2016, that gets us valuations of $32.20 to $42.95, similar to the prices in the previous paragraph.              

 

A third way to value the bank is by considering the franchise premium, or what a buyer is willing to pay above TBV for core deposits. It appears that premiums of 5% to 15% are typical. With core deposits of $765 million, this would come to between $38 million and $115 million, or about $11 to $33 per share. With TBV at $21.47, this translates to a price of $32.47 to $54.47 per share.

Each of these three approaches gives us a low-end valuation of about $32, about 25% higher than the current price. At the high end, the range is 66% to 110% above today’s price.

 

 Risks

--This investment thesis is predicated on the assumption that the bank will be sold, or that some other value-creating event will occur. If no deal happens, the stock is not likely to produce great returns. That said, the bank is strong enough that the investment is unlikely to result in permanent capital loss.

-- There is the risk of management making a bad deal, such as acquiring or merging with another small bank. The most value can be created if it is sold to a larger bank.

--A regional economic downturn could adversely affect the bank’s profitability. Given the direct dependence of the bank on North Dakota and indirectly on the energy industry, a period of prolonged depressed oil prices could hurt the bank.

I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I and/or others I advise do not hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

Catalyst

Sale of the bank.

    sort by    

    Description

    Investment Thesis

    I recommend a long position in BNCCORP, Inc. (BNCC) at the current price of $25.80. I believe it likely that BNCC will be sold to a larger bank over the next 12 to 24 months, at a price 25% to 100% higher than the current price. An activist investor with prior experience in this sector is pushing for board representation and a sale of the company. BNCC is too small and inefficient to be viable as an independent bank in the long term, and an event will probably occur within the next couple of years. (Note: BNCC is a small-cap stock, with a market-cap of $89 million, and is best suited for small funds and PAs.)

    Background

    BNCC is a Bismarck, North Dakota-based community bank with 16 branches (operating as BNC National Bank) in North Dakota, Arizona, and Minnesota. It also conducts mortgage banking operations in those three states, and in Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, and Missouri. The bank was founded in 1987. Gregory Cleveland, co-founder, was President/CEO of the bank from 1995 until his death in 2013. He was succeeded by the current CEO, Timothy Franz, who was previously CFO. The second co-founder, Tracy Scott, is chairman of the board.

    BNCC’s lending focus is to small and mid-sized businesses, as opposed to retail lending or to large companies. At the end of 2016, only about 14% of its $414 million of loans held for investment were consumer loans; the balance was business loans. The bank also provides mortgage banking and wealth management services. On the deposit side, the bank has a very low-cost base of core deposits. Approximately 75% of deposits and 66% of loans are in North Dakota, and North Dakota’s economy is dependent on the energy and agricultural markets. Arizona is its next largest market, and Minnesota is the smallest of its key markets.

    Financial Performance

    The bank had its share of troubles in the financial crisis, but has bounced back strongly since then. The bank took $21 million from the Treasury in 2009 by issuing preferred stock; it was paying 9% on this preferred stock. The preferred was redeemed in 2015 using a combination of cash on hand and $10 million of borrowings (at 6.35%).

    Performance in recent years has been decent. In each of the last four years, net income (to common shareholders) has been about $7 million, or about $2.00 per share. ROE has ranged between 10% and 15% recently, and ROA between 0.78% and 1.07%.

    SUMMARY INCOME STATEMENT ($000)

    2016

    2015

    2014

    2013

     Interest Income

     29,346

     27,915

     29,264

     23,706

     Interest Expense

     (3,343)

     (2,570)

     (3,308)

     (3,861)

     Net Interest Income

     26,003

     25,345

     25,956

     19,845

     Provision for Credit Losses

     (800)

     400

     800

     (700)

     Non-Interest Income

     25,777

     24,950

     20,454

     29,285

     Non-Interest Expense

     (41,193)

     (37,544)

     (34,683)

     (35,981)

     Profit before Taxes

     9,787

     13,151

     12,527

     12,449

     Income Taxes

     (2,631)

     (3,945)

     (4,071)

     (3,822)

     Net Income

     7,156

     9,206

     8,456

     8,627

     Preferred Stock dividends

     -  

     (1,656)

     (1,796)

     (1,320)

     Net Income to Common Sh/h

     7,156

     7,550

     6,660

     7,307

             

     Avg diluted shares O/S (000s)

     3,521

     3,498

     3,491

     3,468

     EPS diluted

     $2.03

     $2.16

     $1.91

     $2.11

             

    Efficiency Ratio

    79.55%

    74.65%

    74.73%

    73.24%

             

    Net Interest Margin

    3.03%

    2.96%

    3.07%

    2.65%

    Return on Common Equity

    10.35%

    12.21%

    12.37%

    15.15%

    ROAA

    0.78%

    1.01%

    0.94%

    1.07%

     

    SUMMARY BALANCE SHEET ($MM)

    2016

    2015

    2014

    2013

     Loans Outstanding

     446

     422

     399

     341

     Investment Sec Avail for Sale

     400

     419

     449

     436

     Other Assets

     64

     63

     86

     66

       Total Assets

     910

     904

     934

     843

             

     Deposits

     753

     780

     811

     723

     Other liabilities

     84

     55

     40

     50

     Preferred Stock--9%

     -  

     -  

     21

     21

     Shareholders' Equity (common)

     74

     69

     62

     49

       Total Liabilities & Sh/h Equity

     910

     904

     934

     843

             

     Shares outstanding (millions)

     3.46

     3.43

     3.41

     3.37

             

     TBV/share

     $21.47

     $20.12

     $18.28

     $14.45

             

    NPL/Total Loans

    0.54%

    0.15%

    0.02%

    1.77%

     

    Regional Economy

     

     

     

    About 66% of the bank’s outstanding loans are in North Dakota, and thus vulnerable to the state of the regional economy. The region has prospered in recent years as a result of the oil and gas drilling boom in the Baaken oil fields. With about 75% of the bank’s deposits and two-thirds of its loans originating in ND, a prolonged period of depressed energy prices would hurt the bank. Only 2.4% of total loans held for investment are for E&P in ND, but the ripple effects of an energy downturn would have a greater impact on the bank’s financial performance.

    Note: I couldn’t find a chart that also included 2016 statistics. But looking at tables with monthly production data, 2016 production decreased by approximately 10-15% from 2015 levels.

    (Source: https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf)

     

     

    Activist Investor

    Without a catalyst, there would be little to get excited about with this bank. Relative to other small publicly traded banks, it seems fairly priced at 1.2x TBV and about 12x earnings. However, with the presence of a credible activist shareholder as catalyst, the stock is potentially cheap. Rangeley Capital, a Connecticut-based hedge fund and a long-time shareholder, owns just under 6% of BNCC, and is pushing for a sale of the company. After failing to get the board to act last year, Rangeley made a public statement at the end of October asking the board to explore “all strategic alternatives” and to add an independent director with a significant stake in the company to assist in the process.

    http://seekingalpha.com/article/4017284-rangeley-capital-calls-full-review-strategic-alternatives-bncc

    Rangeley was previously involved in behind-the-scenes activism with OBA Financial (OBAF) and Ocean Shore Financial (OSHC), both of which were subsequently sold. They have stated that they will “continue to review all options for maximizing the bank’s value, including running an alternative slate of directors at the next annual meeting.” Given Rangeley’s prior experiences, I believe that they are likely to ultimately succeed in having the bank sold.

    Valuation

    Why would another bank be attracted to BNCC, and what might it be willing to pay?

    Aside from a desire to become bigger and expand its footprint, I can think of at least three reasons why another bank would be interested in acquiring BNCC:

     

     (1)  Low-cost deposit base: Typical of a community bank, BNCC has a very low cost for its deposits. Of its total deposits of $753 million, about 20% are non-interest bearing, with the remainder costing less than 0.4% last year. This deposit base would clearly be attractive to a larger acquirer. That said, the benefits of these low-cost deposits should already be reflected in the bank’s current earnings, and in the stock price.

     

     (2)  Potential cost savings: Like most smaller banks, BNCC has a very high expense structure, as reflected in its efficiency ratio. In 2016 the ratio was almost 80%; the previous year was almost 75%.

    Non-Interest Expense ($000)

     

     

     

    2016

    2015

     Salaries & Employee Benefits

     21,432

     19,692

     Professional Services

     4,581

     3,923

     Data Processing Fees

     3,666

     3,059

     Marketing & Promotion

     3,798

     3,523

     Occupancy

     2,160

     1,981

     Regulatory

     675

     696

     D&A

     1,519

     1,415

     Other

     3,362

     3,255

       Total Non-Interest Expense

     41,193

     37,544

     

     

     

    Efficiency Ratio

    79.55%

    74.65%

     

    There should be potential for significant cost savings for a larger bank that acquired BNCC. The amount of the savings will of course depend on multiple factors, including the overlap of the acquirer’s footprint with that of BNCC. I’m not a banking specialist, but the reports I’ve seen suggest that non-interest expenses can be reduced by between 10% and 20% (which in this case would mean an efficiency ratio of between 64% and 72% for BNCC as part of a larger bank, using 2016’s ratio of almost 80%), and perhaps even more than 20%. This would imply potential cost savings of between $4.1 million and $8.2 million.

     (3)  Underutilized assets: At the end of 2016, the bank was classified as “well-capitalized,” with a total risk-based capital ratio of 18.41% (vs. a requirement of 10% to be considered well-capitalized), and Tier 1 RBC of 17.16% (vs. 8% to be well-capitalized). BNCC’s asset structure is unusual in that a very large portion is in investment securities, earning low returns. At the end of 2016, the bank had $910 million in total assets. Of this, $415 million was in loans held for investment, and $400 million in investment securities available for sale. In 3Q2016, the loans earned an average rate of 4.72%, while the investments yielded about 2.1%. (4Q and full year 2016 data is not yet available, but the numbers will be similar.) So there is the potential to deploy the assets to earn higher returns. My guess is that a more aggressive bank could potentially earn an incremental 100-150 bps on the $400 million investment portfolio, generating an additional $4 to $6 million of interest income.

     

    Below is an estimate of what BNCC earnings could look like if an acquirer is able to generate the magnitude of cost savings and additional interest income that I’ve discussed above:

    2016

     LOW

     HIGH

     Actual income before income taxes

     9,787

     9,787

     Potential cost savings

     4,119

     8,239

     Incremental interest income

     4,000

     6,000

     Pro forma pre-tax income

     17,906

     24,026

     Pro-forma net inc (35% tax rate)

     11,639

     15,617

     Diluted shares outstanding

     3.521

     3.521

     Pro-forma EPS

     $3.31

     $4.44

    Assuming that my assumptions for cost savings and incremental revenue are reasonable, it’s not hard to imagine an acquirer paying a multiple of at least 10x on the pro-forma EPS, or at least $33 to $44 per share.

    I’m not a big fan of P/BV valuations. That said, I assume the bank should get at least 1.5x TBV, and possibly over 2x. With TBV at $21.47 at the end of 2016, that gets us valuations of $32.20 to $42.95, similar to the prices in the previous paragraph.              

     

    A third way to value the bank is by considering the franchise premium, or what a buyer is willing to pay above TBV for core deposits. It appears that premiums of 5% to 15% are typical. With core deposits of $765 million, this would come to between $38 million and $115 million, or about $11 to $33 per share. With TBV at $21.47, this translates to a price of $32.47 to $54.47 per share.

    Each of these three approaches gives us a low-end valuation of about $32, about 25% higher than the current price. At the high end, the range is 66% to 110% above today’s price.

     

     Risks

    --This investment thesis is predicated on the assumption that the bank will be sold, or that some other value-creating event will occur. If no deal happens, the stock is not likely to produce great returns. That said, the bank is strong enough that the investment is unlikely to result in permanent capital loss.

    -- There is the risk of management making a bad deal, such as acquiring or merging with another small bank. The most value can be created if it is sold to a larger bank.

    --A regional economic downturn could adversely affect the bank’s profitability. Given the direct dependence of the bank on North Dakota and indirectly on the energy industry, a period of prolonged depressed oil prices could hurt the bank.

    I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
    I and/or others I advise do not hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

    Catalyst

    Sale of the bank.

    Messages


    SubjectMissing Charts
    Entry02/18/2017 04:44 AM
    Memberladera838

    I had included two charts in the writeup, which don't seem to have shown up there. Apologies. I've pasted them below:

     

     

    Note: I couldn’t find a chart that also included 2016 statistics. But looking at tables with monthly production data, 2016 production decreased by approximately 10-15% from 2015 levels. 

    (Source: https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf)

     

     

     

     


    SubjectRe: Questions & Comment
    Entry02/21/2017 09:58 AM
    Memberladera838

    david101 -- Thanks for your questions and comments. I hope you're right about the potential non-interest expense savings. If 25-30% is indeed reasonable, it increases the odds of a buyout price in the high $40s.

    There are a number of potential buyers of BNCC, though I don't know which ones have actually expressed interest. Among regional banks with a presence in ND are Alerus (ALRS), First International Bank & Trust, Bell Bank, and Bremer National (privately owned). MN possibilities include Minnwest and Stearns Bank (SFSI). Among larger national banks with an ND presence are US Bank, Wells Fargo, and Bank of the West.

    NPA's have improved in recent years, from 2.45% of total assets in 2011 to 0.09% in 2015. NPAs increased from $807K at the end of 2015 to $2.7 million at the end of 2016, increasing the NPAs to 0.29% of total assets. The increase relates primarly to one energy loan, which has been partially charged off, and some smaller loans.

     

      2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011 
     NPA/Total Assets  0.29% 0.09% 0.03% 0.79% 2.03% 2.45%

    Hope this helps.


    SubjectRe: Re: Questions & Comment
    Entry02/21/2017 02:52 PM
    Memberspike945

    thanks for the idea.  

    i would just point out that it took Rangley a long time to get those two banks to sell.  we were involved in both of them.

    i think in both of those cases there were clear buyers of the banks - especially in Maryland.  this name hasn't jumped out to me yet as one that is a willing seller.


    SubjectRe: Re: Re: Re: Questions & Comment
    Entry02/21/2017 06:41 PM
    Memberladera838

    David--Agreed!


    SubjectRe: Re: Re: Re: Questions & Comment
    Entry02/22/2017 10:29 AM
    Memberspike945

    i agree with your comments.  i was just cautioning that a sale might not happen right away.  Rangley was in the other two names for a long time.  Nice write up.


    SubjectRe: Re: Re: Re: Re: Questions & Comment
    Entry02/22/2017 03:36 PM
    Memberladera838

    Spike945--Thanks very much for your input. You have more experience with Rangeley than I do, and I appreciate your comments.

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