SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust SPY S
July 10, 2015 - 12:05am EST by
wanna974
2015 2016
Price: 204.90 EPS 0 0
Shares Out. (in M): 851 P/E 0 0
Market Cap (in $M): 168,360 P/FCF 0 0
Net Debt (in $M): 0 EBIT 0 0
TEV (in $M): 0 TEV/EBIT 0 0
Borrow Cost: General Collateral

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Description

Policy Blunders in China Likely Sink Global Markets Because Everyone is Banned to Sell

Before I go any further, I want everyone to know I'm sharing a view that I feel incredibly strong about and believe it to be right. Global investors thus far have largely paid attention squarely on what is happening in Greece ( shown by looking at most read articles on Bloomberg terminal) and China appears to be a side show with the gambling A share market crumbling that no one paid attention on the way up. Many strategists and economists have offered views that largely along the lines of government's ability to contain crisis and coupled with indices there rebounding nicely, people appear to believe the crisis is averted. I'm presenting a thesis here, supported with arguments, that the recent policies containing the rout in China will create acute and likely uncontainable economic problems which will undoubtedly spread to global markets and causing a big crisis if those policies are not reversed very quickly. This is the first time in my investing career that I ever had a view about market direction.

China's stock value decline is not the problem, its crisis containing measures are. The rapid fire policy decisions made at the very top of the communist government show a blatant lack of understanding about market functions and will cause an acute liquidity crunch in the real economy with few remedies. In fact, the higher the stock index level goes in Shanghai, the worse the situation is, creating an incredible shorting opportunity in gloabl risky assets. 

Many media outlets/analysts/ strategists and talking heads have largely equated the most recent government intervention as a form of QE similar to those launched by the Fed and ECB. Those individuals failed to understand the real policy implications of China's market saving strategy. In fact, the Chinese style market rescue is locking down massive liquidity in an unprecedented fashion from the real economy. This is an issue that western investors have never experienced or have an understanding of. Government is applying brute force/power of state to prevent all selling, large investors and small investors alike. Two measures: 1. the stock halt of half of the listed companies that is ongoing among Chinese stocks 2. the recent measure of banning directors, company and any 5%+ owners from selling shares. In the history of stock investing, there has never been a market rescue measure that involved banning sellers, hence I don't believe the consequences of that policy is well understood by the policymaker in China or the general investing public in the U.S. But the end result is plain and simple, a lock down of liquidity. If no sellers are allowed to sell, the market loses its function and loses its ability to transmit liquidity. The Chinese central bank reportedly drew a blank check supporting the market, but different from the check drew by ECB and the Fed, the sellers have no ability to access it because it is illegal for them to sell. An acute liquidity crunch is imminent in the Chinese real economy due to investing capital not being able to be deployed as they are locked in the stock market by party decree.

Here's a simple example, if you have 100 million RMB invested in a 2 billion RMB company in the stock market in China and you come across an extremely appealing investment opportunity requiring you to allocate 5 million RMB of investment capital, you simply have to forgo that project due to the illegality of selling 5 million dollar worth of your investment holdings in the public markets. Imagine this going on on a much much larger scale. Listed companies have to buy back its own shares with cash, forgoing investment projects. SOEs putting funds to support the stock market etc. The CPC created a very unique Chinese market where investors are not allowed to sell and only allowed to buy. This quickly suck up liquidity in the real economy and then also bans sufficient capital from leaving due to restrictive measures put in place to prevent selling. Recent round of media propaganda painted selling as unpatriotic. Despite the absurdity of how it sounds, if you have an understanding of how the Chinese government, busienss work, you will know that people are trained to respect the party's wish and often they put that ahead of economic interests for long term benefits. Unfortunately, this party wish is sucking liqudity out of the real economy. On the side of small investors, large amount of liquidity are simply trapped in stocks that are halted. Companies have halted their stocks in mass to avoid a turbulent market and stock price declines. Which caused worse declines when mutual fund redemption came in. Those are all containable crisis should the government simply put a large enough check to buy the market but the rush of the policy making, the party also decided to ban sellers, not shortsellers, real sellers. It should come as no surprise that Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are soaring when you mostly ban selling. Yet the higher the market goes, the more liquidity it gets sucked in. As we know, market support policies are easy to put in, very hard to remove. Investors become addicted to those policies. Locking up liquidity makes matter worse because when they are allowed to sell, they tend to sell in mass creating a run. Think a bank that is closed, then all of a sudden open it. Everyone would want to get their money so it won't close tomorrow. The unintended consequences of these policies will create a likely severe liquidity crunch in the Chinese economy causing investment to drop and GDP growth to slow down. The higher the index goes, the worse it is for the actual economy. I think data will come fairly quickly that investment activity is falling off a cliff as a result of the selling restrictions that are placed in the market. But by then, it is very likely to have translated into a real economic problem and it would be nearly impossible to exit without creating a panic. Poorly crafted policies are the worst; they are hard to reverse.

Many of you may be asking me for a quantitative measure. Unfortunately I'm not an economist, not one by training anyways. But the roughly 3.3 trillion dollar a month trading volume was cited in the news (China has no HFT and T+1 selling). The total market value of the halted stocks are roughly 2.4 trillion USD. I'm not entirely sure about the total lock up of 5%, directors and company itself. But it is a sizable amount to be taken out of the economy at the precise time when liquidity is needed to boost confidence.  As investors scramble for cash elsewhere, other sectors of the economy will get hit. Iron ore drop did not come from lowered demand or higher supply, it came from tightening economic conditions despite those are present too. 
 
Why have people been so willfully ignorant to such a huge risk? I have no idea. I would like to just draw paralell to the summer of 2011 when investor attention was sqaurely on debt ceiling when European crisis descended. A few other points:
 
1. We are all well aware of other hidden issues in China's credit market and a lightening rod will cause many unintended knockon effects. Evergrande real estate, for example, had a policy introduced earlier in the year which contractually obligates them to repay any homebuyers if they change their mind for wahtever reason. It is widely known that they do not have the cash flow to cover even a modest amount of redemption, much less a big massive one caused by a liquidity crunch. What happens to the credit market, shadow banking market?
 
2. I don't think the investment community is trained to spot fake indices. Shanghai index rallies should obviously be regarded as positive. It is NOT. The entire market is trading in the absent of liquidity and massive moral hazard at the policy direction. It would be shocking if it doesn't go up. But like fake goods, fake companies, China is having a new export for global investors -- fake index levels. Market as a pricing mechanism stops function when you ban sellers. We are looking at fake prices that might look good but in fact, the higher the fake price is, the bigger the issue is. Government's restrictive policies on selling cannot be removed, broker-dealer support cannot be removed. Meanwhile they are sucking up what's remaining of the liquidity in the general economy into the market at artificially inflated prices. It can only end in collapse especially given the fact acute problem in investment activities will show up very quickly. 
 
3. Global markets' insulation from Chinese domestic liquidity. As China's capital account is still largely closed, a crunch of liquidity in China will not be felt elsewhere in the global markets. Unless when things went wrong in southeast asia, Chinese people have no direct access to dollar, euro or yen. This serves as a great way to prevent a spillover of global capital markets turmoil, but worsens the problem when a domestic liquidity crisis unfolds.
 
4. While I'm not entirely sure about the scale of the problem, I have yet to see anybody really raised what I described in this post. The U.S. markets are massively underpricing a real substantial and likely inevitable acute risk in Chinese economy. I'm not interested in all the long term economic problems that this failed reform will bring, but an acute liquidity crunch will crush global markets. 
 
In conclusion, I'm suggesting a drastic reallocation out of all risky assets while the rest of the market is still digesting what the potential likely impact is. I think the true edge of this post is investors have never experienced two new fake things courtesy of the Chinese government. 1. Fake prices 2. Fake index levels. I'm convinced that policy remedies are likely difficult to come by for a few reasons. 1. It requires a 180 degree U turn of policy makers prior measures. 2. policy decisions are most likely made at the very top of the decision making body which makes it hard to change. 3. the immediate impact of policy change will be painful. Forget about Greece, look at China.
 
 
I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I and/or others I advise do not hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

Catalyst

The catalyst is pretty clearly outlined in the post. 

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