WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES WGO S
June 20, 2017 - 12:43pm EST by
mtbattie
2017 2018
Price: 29.53 EPS 0 0
Shares Out. (in M): 32 P/E 0 0
Market Cap (in $M): 933 P/FCF 0 0
Net Debt (in $M): 318 EBIT 0 0
TEV ($): 1 TEV/EBIT 0 0
Borrow Cost: General Collateral

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  • Recreational
  • Overstated Earnings
  • Competitive Threats
  • Customer Loss
  • recreational vehicles

Description

The RV upcycle - in its record 8th year – is running out of gas. Since early ‘16, industry retail registration growth (i.e. sell-through) has trailed wholesale shipment growth (i.e. sell-in). This has led to mounting inventory on dealer lots, and suggests a turn in the cycle is near.

The impending, inevitable turn in the RV cycle will have the biggest impact on OEMs operating with:

  • Subscale;

  • Greater exposure to higher-priced motorhomes, demand for which is more cyclical than the for lower-priced Towables;

  • Cost disadvantages and higher retail prices within each category;

  • Higher fixed-asset bases;

  • Less financial flexibility;

  • More reliance on favorable financing to drive demand;

  • A dealer network with too much product on its lots, and;

  • Brands losing resonance with consumers.

A company that checks every one of these boxes is Winnebago (WGO).

WGO is an attractive short at this point in the RV cycle given WGO’s:

  • Reliance on Motorhome sales, where it’s losing share – WGO’s core business (‘Class A/C’ Motorhomes; ~54% of its 2016 pro-forma sales) operates at subscale to #2 Forest Hill and #1 Thor Industries (THO) and is shedding market share;

  • Slow response to consumer trends – WGO is behind the competition meeting consumers’ shifting preference for smaller, more affordable RV floorplans; THO and Forest River are meeting that demand at lower prices and higher margin;

  • Cost disadvantage vs. industry leaders - THO and Forest River’s superior scale, more decentralized “assembler” business model, and focus on faster-turning Towable units gives them a cost competitive advantage vs. WGO. The big players will most likely continue taking share;

  • Sales to biggest customer are declining – WGO is losing wallet share with its largest customer, and the country’s largest RV dealer, Camping World (CWH);

  • Aggressive takeover multiple for Grand Design - Problems with both its core business motivated WGO to overpay for a fast-growing, PE-backed Towable company, Grand Design, in late ’16;

  • Levered balance sheet impairs flexibility to handle downturn - WGO’s balance sheet is levered, limiting its options in a down cycle, and;

  • Expectations have not reset - Consensus expectations for WGO are too high; and WGO’s aggressive earnings management obscures the full extent of its problems.

WGO’s current forward NTM EV/EBITDA multiple is ~8x; and market expectations are for HSD organic growth through fiscal ‘19. [1]  HSD sales CAGR would require an unlikely resumption of organic growth for WGO, given: industry data is worsening; THO continues to take share; and CWH continues to pull business from WGO.

 

We see 4:1 risk/reward with a base case target price of ~$14 (for fiscal ’19 realized in Sep. ’18) and $34 in our risk case, which we view as less likely. [2] 

 

WHY THIS OPPORTUNITY EXISTS

Few public peers – RV OEMs have been consolidating. There are two public-traded RV OEMs - WGO and THO – and a decreasing number of large, private peers.

Scant sell-side coverage - Both WGO and THO have a short list of covering analysts devoid of any bulge-bracket firms.

Limited public suppliers and dealers - Beyond OEMs, there are three public RV suppliers (HZN, LCII, and PATK) and one major dealer (CWH), all with seven analysts or fewer.

THO doesn’t do earnings calls.

Investors’ myopic focus on timing the RV cycle – With WGO, the practice of trying to accurately call the precise end of the RV cycle is reaching for pennies under an approaching steam roller – and it distracts investors from WGO’s structural issues.

WGO likely needs to tap equity market - WGO would likely raise equity should the cycle turn, motivating management and covering analysts’ to be more promotional than normal.  

 

SHORT RV INDUSTRY BACKGROUND/HISTORY

RV Categories Motorhomes vs. Towable - RVs sales exist in two major categories: Motorhomes and Towable. Motorhomes have a drivetrain, engine and bigger chassis, whereas a Towable relies on a truck or SUV for these things. RV manufacturers buy chassis from Ford, Mercedes, and Freightliner making these costs for THO and WGO pass-through. Because of the large fixed-cost for chassis, Motorhomes have lower gross margins and greater operational leverage to changes in volumes than Towables. Also, higher volumes drive chassis costs lower through volume discounts – further enhancing THO and Forest River’s cost advantage vs. WGO.

Motorhome category is further subdivided into: Class A; Class B; and Class C.

Towable into: Travel Trailers; Fifth Wheel; Camping Trailers; Toy Haulers; and Destination Trailers.

 

Lineups by OEM - RV line-ups for THO and WGO by relevant subcategories (note: WGO’s skews towards higher-priced units Motorhomes):

 

Market share breakdown - WGO’s relies more on Motorhome sales vs. its competition (even after its Grand Design acquisition). Motorized and Towable ’16 pro-forma market share and sales-by-product class breakdown:

 

Source: Nov. 2016 Investor Presentation

WGO shed additional market share in Q117. Through March 2017, WGO’s YTD Motorized unit market share was ~13% vs. the 19% highlighted above. [3] 

61% of WGO’s sales (pro-forma for Grand Design sales) come from Motorhomes; consequently, significant declines in this key market spell disaster for WGO.

WGO’s dollar consolidated market share is higher than its total unit market share because of higher ASPs for Motorhomes. Regardless, WGO’s sales and market share are concentrated in Motorhomes, where it has been losing significant share.

Industry Consolidating - Over the last decade, the RV industry has been consolidating. Retail unit market share has been concentrating among two major players: Thor Industries (THO) and privately-held, Berkshire-owned Forest River. This consolidation has enhanced THO and Forest River’s cost advantages.

 

 

 

CYCLE CONSIDERATIONS

RV Cycle looks to be turning - From the depths of the Great Recession, Recreational Vehicle (RV) wholesale shipments have grown for 7+ years. Industry shipments have never recorded such a long period of uninterrupted unit growth. [4] Beyond mere cyclical tailwinds, the RV industry points to secular drivers: aging Boomers; millennials embracing a more “active” lifestyle; people desiring cheaper vacations; an increase in more RV-related activities (i.e. youth travel sporting events, concerts and festivals, college football games, etc.). [5] 

But RV retail registration growth has decelerated since early ‘16. Meanwhile, retail registrations haven’t kept pace with wholesale shipments, causing RV inventories to build on dealer lots and raising investors’ concern the RV cycle is turning. [6] 

A study of past RV cycles does little to assuage cycle fears. RV sales have been more volatile than automobile SAAR. RV shipments-to-U.S. SAAR since 1976:

 

 

The trend-line for this ratio of RV-to-car sales has a modest upward slope; but there's less evidence for the kind of super-cycle, secular growth in RV ownership the industry claims. The level of new buyers over the last seven years is consistent with a typical bull cycle. Past cycles suggest that during significant downturns many abandon RV ownership, and what remains is RV-sales equal to about 1.0 - 1.5% the level of annualized vehicle sales.

Past industry dips in wholesale RV shipments include:

  • 1973-74 (-49% drawdown);

  • 1977-80 (-76%);

  • 1985 (-13%);

  • 1989-91 (-24%);

  • 1995 (-5%);

  • 2000-01 (-20%), and;

  • 2007-09 (-58%).

The average drawdown is -35%. The two most dramatic declines (-76%; -58%) followed outsized growth and exogenous events that affected RV affordability: spikes in oil prices (‘70s) and a tightening of RV credit (during the Great Recession).

 

Parsing RV shipment data one layer deeper, wholesale shipments for Motorhomes have been more cyclical than for Towable units (given Motorhomes are ~4x more expensive).

From peak-to-trough 2004-09, wholesale shipments of Motorhomes declined 81%, far outpacing the 54% drawdown in Towable shipments. From its prior trough, Motorhome shipments units have grown at a 22% CAGR vs. 14% for Towable – again demonstrating the greater cyclicality of demand for Motorhomes. Therefore, at peak cycle there’s far more risk with a company reliant on Motorhome sales than one skewed towards Towables. Valuations should reflect this.

 

 

The greater cyclicality of RVs (and more so of Motorhomes) is because RVs are a discretionary, “play” purchase lacking the “work” uses of automobiles, and the RV industry relies on more aggressive financing than the automotive industry, exacerbating the product’s inherent cyclicality.

RV loan terms can stretch out 20 years vs. ~7 years on high-end for auto loans. Also, we’ve heard of recent instances of aggressive sub-prime lending on Towable RVs with loan-to-value ratios surpassing 100%. This aggressive lending combined with the tax treatment of RV loans (the interest can often be tax deductible as a “second home”) leads to more boom and bust. And more aggressive financing this time around has likely prolonged the current RV cycle by bringing incremental buyers to the fray. But pulling demand forward robs future industry growth.

Making sense of THO’s recent quarter - Thor (THO) recorded robust quarterly results on June 5th, with 14% and 29% organic revenue growth y/y in Towable and Motorized. The stock market rewarded THO and WGO, which was up 7.5% on the news. THO’s results – while strong on the surface - provided many negative read-throughs for WGO when considered with recent industry data:

  1. Q117 Motorized wholesale shipments were +16%, but outpacing the 13% growth in registrations;

  2. Class A Motorized sales remain weak industry-wide;

  3. Industry Class C Motorhome shipments exceeded registrations in Q117 despite the category’s strong growth. This a category where the WGO CEO suggested price competition is heating up, and;

  4. THO took significant market share in Motorized in the Q (with organic growth of 29% y/y in Q, which well exceeded industry growth); or it stuffed its channel.  

Source: Factset, as of 6/19/17

 

WINNEBAGO (WGO) – THE SHORT CASE

WGO’s reliance on Motorhome: more operating leverage, more earnings volatility

WGO faces all the cyclical headwinds of its RV-industry peers; but its problems don’t stop there. First, its focus on lower-turn, higher-priced units exacerbates its operating leverage vs. the competition.

WGO and its chief competitor THO have very different operating models. THO is a decentralized conglomeration of consumer brands and an “assembler” of RVs that relies more on component manufacturers. WGO manufactures in-house most all components but the chassis, drivetrain, and engine.

WGO’s business model, therefore, has a higher fixed-asset base, higher fixed costs, and more operating leverage from volume changes.

A look at relative historical gross margins between the two public peers (THO vs. WGO) reveals this:

 

Source: Bloomberg

 

Further, WGO’s focus on higher-priced, lower-volume Class A motorhomes means higher fixed overhead is allocated over lower volumes, exacerbating its operating leverage.  

Because WGO has both too much financial leverage and higher operating leverage, investors should assign a significant discount to WGO’s peak earnings versus its peers (which they are not).

 

WGO’s Competitive challenges

Second, WGO’s competitors are able to produce units for cheaper; and so, sell RVs at lower prices while earning superior margin. WGO’s competition (THO and Forest River) have taken share by:

  • Achieving superior scale through organic and inorganic means;

  • Outsourcing much of their supply-chain;

  • Lowering their manufacturing costs, and;

  • Focusing on the smaller Towable floorplans consumers want.

With scale and cost advantages, THO and Forest River offer greater value to customers on ‘Class A/C’ Motorhomes than WGO does. THO has superior gross margins in Towable and Motorized, despite selling at lower ASPs vs. WGO. WGO’s less efficient plants, vertically-integrated supply chain, and focus on slower turning units has left it unable to respond to its competition.  

In June ’16, WGO management conceded:

…our competitors are being extremely proactive and aggressive in terms of some very aggressive price points within the Class A gas segment. Winnebago historically has not been known as…the low-cost leader from a manufacturing standpoint…And so that market trend driven by our fierce competitors to offering increased value on the lower price points of Class A gas is something organizationally that we're trying to figure out how to respond to in a profitable way.

Also, the price competition for WGO is becoming a game of “whack-a-mole” – as it spreads outside of Class A into other categories:

…we are seeing some softness in some other parts of the [Class C] line…what – and I'm sure our competitors and some of the other companies would probably validate this – but what you saw in Class A a couple years ago is likely happening a bit in Class C, where the product value proposition is increasing quickly and significantly.

 

Challenges with biggest customer – Camping World (CWH)

Third, WGO is losing share with its biggest customer, Camping World (CWH), who is the largest retail RV dealer network in the country. CWH is consolidating dealers, growing its private label business, and actively taking business away from WGO (at an accelerated pace after WGO’s Grand Design acquisition).

RV buyers are brand-agnostic and more interested in entry-level price points. This makes RVs ripe for private-label disruption; and CWH is great at delivering private label RVs at value prices. This is why over 40% of its towable units are private label. [7] 

Further, an underappreciated element of WGO’s Grand Design acquisition is how it infuriated CWH. Grand Design was started by ex-Thor folks. Out of loyalty to THO for their support during the last down cycle, CWH told Grand Design from the beginning it would not buy from them. In response, Grand Design did the only thing it could at that point – refashioned its mole as a beauty mark to customers, holding it up that they didn’t sell to CWH as a point of pride.  

When WGO bought Grand Design and the latter continued its practice of saying it would never sell to CWH, CWH retaliated against the entire WGO product line.

At a June 7th, 2017 investor conference, Marcus Lemonis didn’t mince words when he said Grand Design “will never get a f-ing penny from us…And when Winnebago bought them, we taught Winnebago a quick lesson.”

He characterized Grand Design as “high-priced towables that will be the first to get crushed in the downturn.”

He argued Thor and Forest River “understand the price point” and that CWH:

…[does] not participate in $300,000 and $400,000 motorhomes or $80,000 fifth wheels or $120,000 gas units [as WGO does]. And it's important to know in all the segments, from travel trailer to diesels, there are stratified price points inside of those silos. So, we want to be at the lower half of all of them.

The subtext is that WGO’s manufacturing costs are preventing them from achieving those price points – and therefore irrelevant to CWH’s strategy.

Lemonis admitted to even buying dealers that are important to WGO/Grand Design just to “wipe out” those dealers from WGO:

…it becomes very painful for [WGO] when we start buying dealers that they build their business on…We like to look at the big dealers that do business with the manufacturers that like to tell people they don't sell us and buy them [i.e. Grand Design/WGO]. And we actually made a point of it this year. In fact, I think we took out a pretty good chunk of business…Maybe over $150 million worth of business we wiped out. So, if you don't want to sell to us, no problem. [8] 

Not words you ever want to hear from one of your biggest customers. He went on to explicitly state that WGO will find itself in the most trouble when the cycle turns:

I would caution anybody from investing in any business that has products on the shelf or on the lot that are on the upper tier of any price point, because as you think about the downslide in the economy or the tightening of credit, which is probably more relevant, the tightening of credit means the tightening of advance rates. 

 

 

 

 

WGO sales now represent ~5% of CWH total sales, making them a small supplier for CWH. Troubling, given CWH still represented 17% of WGO’s 2016 sales. [9] Through the first 6 months of fiscal 2017, sales to CWH are down 27% y/y. [10] Also, La Mesa RV – another > 10% customer for WGO could one day get acquired by CWH, after which time CWH would likely “wipe out” more WGO business from that sales outlet. Together, CWH and La Mesa still represent more than ¼ of WGO sales through first six months of fiscal 2017.

 

WGO’s other issues

As if these competitive issues weren’t enough, WGO is also up against:

Rising raw material and labor costs - Rising raw material costs (steel, aluminum, etc.) and labor shortages in Elkhart and Lagrange counties are impacting all RV suppliers and OEMs. But given WGO’s subscale, both will impact WGO more than its competition.

Levered balance sheet - WGO’s balance sheet is levered, especially for peak or near-peak cycle. This will diminish its options in a downturn. Following the Grand Design acquisition, WGO’s net leverage increased to ~2.5x. It now stands at 2.3x; with a stated goal of bringing it down to under 1.5x by fiscal ‘18 (while also confusingly hinting at the possibility of looking for M&A opportunities in adjacent, non-RV markets). [11] But a turn in the cycle and EBITDA declines anywhere near the past downturn would push WGO’s leverage to even more dangerous levels and its goals out of reach absent an equity raise.

Overpaid to diversify away from its troubled core - On October ‘16, WGO purchased Grand Design – a share-taker in the Towable segment of RVs. This acquisition, while sensible diversification into a faster segment of the market, came at a rich price: 8.3x NTM EV/EBITDA multiple (on top of peak or near-peak earnings). WGO purchased Grand Design from PE-outfit Summit Partners. Desperate as WGO was to “scramble the egg” and obscure the challenges facing them in its core biz, WGO looks to have overpaid for Grand Design and angered its then biggest customer in the process.

C-Suite Turnover - Recent C-Suite turnover also raises eyebrows. In ‘15, long-time CEO, Randy Potts, stepped down. Former CEO/Chairman Bob Olson was then appointed interim CEO. About a month later, he stepped down. Board Chair, Larry Erickson, then became interim. He was replaced by 45-year old Michael Happe in Jan. 2016. Mr. Happe made a CFO change in May ‘17. All this turnover coincided with numerous earnings quality “red flags” (rising DSO, DSI) plus sagging dealer sell-through/mounting inventory.

Insider sales – Both Potts and Olson have been net sellers of WGO stock.

 

WGO has been overearning by stuffing the channel

The CEO turnover in late ‘15 followed a time of poor earnings quality where WGO was possibly pulling demand forward by stuffing its dealer network with excess units.

WGO’s struggles in the CWH channel help explain this trend. The in-fill and DSO noted above coincided with the peak in WGO sales through the CWH channel:

 

WGO’s large in-fill in fiscal ‘13 and concordant decline in sales to CWH may be from WGO overstuffing this channel in fiscal ‘13 with higher-priced and slower-moving inventory; and consequently, it has been losing share there ever since.

But the in-fill expands beyond CWH; because the “in-fill” period also coincided with significant increases in the number of total dealers in the Motorized dealer network and the average number of WGO units per dealer in both segments:

 

Source: WGO’s 10-K “Distribution and Financing” disclosures.

The ill-health of WGO’s dealer channel likely motivated WGO to pursue Grand Design. And while WGO’s growth in Towable and turns at retail have improved since that deal, WGO still overpaid for the asset. [12] Also, its problems in Motorized loom larger. And if these problems persist, they will overwhelm any sustained performance on the Towable side. Also, industry Towable registration growth for April 2017 decelerated - up 4.5% in April vs. 11.9% y/y through first four months of the year.  

Another alarm bell - WGO’s 295 Motorized dealer count as of Feb. 17 is at levels last seen in ’05 (300). Dealer count declined from 300 in ‘05 to a nadir of 225 in ’11, before increasing to 295 by end of fiscal ‘16 - this during a period where CWH has been consolidating dealers. Perhaps another sign of where we are in the cycle.

Dealer sell-through data supports the idea that WGO’s large sell-in from fiscal 2013-15 created a full channel. We measure dealer sell-through as the number of units that WGO is shipping to dealers over TTM period vs. the inventory that is sitting on dealer lots.

Since the large in-fill that began in fiscal ‘13, this ratio has established lower lows in each subsequent February.

With each year deeper in the cycle and with each year lapping the old management team’s aggressive channel fill, dealerships are finding it harder to work through the WGO inventory sitting on its lots.

In the past, management targeted > 2x in Motorhomes for this ratio. [13] 

But by Feb. ‘17 this sell-through ratio fell below 2x. We focus on Motohomes, because the Grand Design makes historical comparisons in this metric for the Towable segment problematic, given Grand Design is a faster-turning business.

And while the DSO trend has improved in recent quarters, organic growth has also slowed. Not surprising, given WGO has been comparing against the in-fill periods.

 

WGO’S RESPONSE / RISKS TO SHORT

What has WGO been doing to address its cost disadvantage and line-up that’s skewed towards the challenged Motorhome category?

  1. M&A - Acquired (at a hefty price) the fastest-growing Towable RV maker Grand Design.

  2. Addressing labor shortages - Moved some production out of Elkhart, Indiana and Lagrange, where there’s a known labor shortage to other areas where it hopes to improve throughput and lower manufacturing costs.

  3. Exiting lower margin business - Exiting the “other manufactured parts” business (use of incremental capacity to manufacture products for outside customers), which is lower gross margin. Still comprised $11mm of fiscal ‘16 sales.

  4. Lower-price point floorplans in Class A - Introduced ‘Class A’ Motorized Vista floorplans, which offers more value price points (pressuring ASPs in the category);

  5. Rationalizing plant and cost reductions - Instituted a “four-pronged” plan to improve inefficient manufacturing. While GM% are up 220bps over the last six months, a lot of this improvement is from favorable temporary mix shift within Towable (i.e. Grand Design does more fifth wheel).

  6. New ERP - Implementing a new ERP system and “strategic sourcing” project that aims to provide ~40bps tailwind to gross margins. Note: WGO is capitalizing significant costs associated with this. In fiscal ‘16, it capitalized $8mm in ERP-related costs, which amounts to 12% of fiscal 2016 EBIT.

  7. Potential inorganic growth in adjacent markets - Announced willingness to expand via M&A into adjacent markets, perhaps in recognition of their limited growth opportunities in the RV space given THO and Forest River’s market leadership and >80% unit share. [14] 

 

VALUATION

In our risk case, we apply current NTM P/E, FCF, and EV/EBITDA) multiples to our fiscal 2019 estimates to derive an average Sep. ’18 target price of ~$34.

In our risk case, we assume:

  • Market’s approach of applying mid-cycle multiples to late cycle earnings power;

  • Seamless integration of Grand Design; DD towable unit and flat ASP growth from the ~$32k in WGO’s first full Q with Grand Design;

  • Class A/C unit growth flat, despite recent negative y/y growth;

  • More moderate low DD Class B unit growth as that biz starts to comp off a higher base;

  • Motorized flat ASP despite recent declines, and;

  • Improved factory throughput to achieve close to THO’s segment Gross margins (i.e. 11.5% and 15% for Motorized and Towable vs. 13% and 16% for THO in 2016). Given its subscale, we do not believe WGO can ever match THO’s margins.

In our base case, we apply mid-cycle, or 10-year median multiples to our fiscal ‘19 projections to arrive at a ~$13 target price, or +49% IRR. We assume:

  • Class A/C unit growth continues declining MSD per year in fiscal 2017-19 with similar declines in ASPs;

  • Class B unit and ASP growth plateau at fiscal ‘17 levels;

  • Towable organic growth moderates to 3%, and;

  • GM% by segment: 8% and 13% for Motorized and Towable, resulting in ~10.5% GM% overall.

  • Note: leverage in our base case would remain above 3x, limiting WGO’s options when dealing with its competitive and cyclical challenges.

     

[1] Assumes $440mm fiscal 2017 run-rate for Grand Design sales.

[2] Based on price of $29.82

[3] SunTrust Research, Statistical Survey. See STRH report, “RV Industry – March by the Numbers (THO/WGO)” from May 12, 2017 and http://www.rvbusiness.com/category/rvia-wholesale-shipments/

[4] RVIA wholesale shipment from 1978-2016

[5] C.f. LCII Investor Presentation from March 14, 2017, page 16, “Why we are so optimistic?”

[6] RVIA/SSI data

[7] In the “Distribution and Financing” section of WGO’s 10-K, it discloses the size of its dealer network and their >10% dealer customers. Note: CWH is disclosed as “Freedom Roads LLC” in the Distribution and Financing section of filings.

[8] Stephens Spring Investment Conference. June 7, 2019 – starting around minute 15 minutes in.

[9] “As it relates to Winnebago and Grand Design, our business with Winnebago is roughly 18% of their entire portfolio. We historically have not bought anything from Grand Design across our entire company. We do no business with them. So we don't see a positive or negative change as it relates to our business.” CWH CEO Lemonis on Nov. 2016 call.

[10] 11.1% of $616mm vs. 21.2% of $440mm. This is all legacy biz – since Grand Design does no biz with WGO.

[11] “…we have acknowledged that when the timing is right, we will seek to identify strategic and profitable diversification opportunities within the outdoor lifestyle sector. Those could reside inside or outside the recreational vehicle market.” March 2017 Conference call

[12] “Both businesses are driving multiple double-digit growth unit wise in Towable shipments. And again, we are hopeful that that can continue. As you might imagine, the law of number starts to take effect as each of these businesses get a little bit bigger in the future. But the good news is that retail is exceeding shipments thus increasing turns, but we're very pleased that both brands are driving significant unit shipment growth.” March 2017 earnings call.

[13] The motorized side has was more in the two turns range and towables maybe more in the 2, 2.5 turns range, and we're probably on the higher side of that number a little bit. But I think we definitely want to make sure that our retail increase continues to exceed our field inventory increase…

[14] “…we have acknowledged that when the timing is right, we will seek to identify strategic and profitable diversification opportunities within the outdoor lifestyle sector. Those could reside inside or outside the recreational vehicle market.” March 2017 Conference call

 

 

Disclaimer

This report (this “Report”) on Winnebago Industries (the “Company”) has been prepared for informational purposes only. As of the date of this Report, we (collectively, the “Authors”) hold short positions tied to the securities of the Company described herein and stand to benefit from a decline in the price of the common stock of the Company. Following publication of this Report, and without further notice, the Authors may increase or reduce their short exposure to the Company’s securities or establish long positions based on changes in market price, market conditions, or the Authors’ opinions with respect to Company prospects. This Report is not designed to be applicable to the specific circumstances of any particular reader. All readers are responsible for conducting their own due diligence and making their own investment decisions with respect to the Company’s securities. Information contained herein was obtained from public sources believed to be accurate and reliable but is presented “as is,” without any warranty as to accuracy or completeness. The opinions expressed herein may change and the Authors undertake no obligation to update this Report. This Report contains certain forward-looking statements and projections which are inherently speculative and uncertain.

 

 

I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I and/or others I advise hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

Catalyst

  • Periodic Registration (SSI) and Shipment (RVIA) Industry data releases (2nd, 3rd, and last week of every month at 1-2 month lag)

  • WGO earnings per-market 6/21

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