Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel WPSC W
August 15, 2007 - 10:53am EST by
blee1020
2007 2008
Price: 15.30 EPS
Shares Out. (in M): 0 P/E
Market Cap (in $M): 250 P/FCF
Net Debt (in $M): 0 EBIT 0 0
TEV (in $M): 0 TEV/EBIT

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Description

Special Situation / Thesis
I propose taking a substantial stake in WPSC at these levels. The basis of the investment is simple.  Our margin of safety is provided by an almost guaranteed return of at least 24% on half of our position between today and October (144% annualized).  The remainder of our position will be invested in what will be the 5th largest steel company in the US, which we estimate to be worth at least $32, more than 100% higher than the current share price (~$16), with many opportunities for further upside (for example, a jury award for ~$215mm or $14/share from a recently won lawsuit).
 
Background
Wheeling-Pitt (WPSC) is a US based steel producer.  This stock has been written up twice on VIC before, and I would encourage readers to skim the prior analysis for a sense of where this company has been.  I hope to give you a glimpse of where I believe it is going.
 
For many years, WPSC was run by the “bad news bears” of the steel industry.  The company’s management achieved the difficult feat of bankrupting itself in one of the greatest steel booms in recent history and managed to destroy shareholder value throughout this most recent up-cycle.  Astoundingly, the same management that ran the company into bankruptcy was able to hold on to their cushy seats as the team selected to run the company after it emerged.  The board clearly did not understand the term, “fiduciary duty.” 
 
Bidding War
Last year, a bidding war for the company began. 
 
The losing proposal: CSN, the Brazilian steelmaker, in a rather complex proposal wanted to infuse capital into the company and eventually take out the majority of shareholders for ~$30/share (I have simplified this some for time’s sake). 
 
The winning proposal: The second proposal came from a private steel service center, Esmark.  Esmark’s proposal was very complex, but I will break down the main points here.  Esmark wanted to achieve the first-ever reverse hostile merger.  In effect, they (a small private company) forced a larger public company (WPSC) to merge with it, handing the keys to the management and directorship over to the hostile company.  They were able to do this by proposing a proxy with their own board of directors, which was voted on by shareholders and was ratified. 
 
Esmark is run by James and Craig Bouchard.  They now run both WPSC and Esmark, as the merger between the two companies will not close until the shareholders vote in Sept/Oct.  Esmark was able to win the bidding war for several reasons:
 
a)       Esmark actively courted the union, and changed a portion of their compensation to a profit sharing structure.  The union played a large role in the negotiations
b)       They promised to bring with them a below-market priced steel slab agreement (the raw material needed to make hot rolled coils of steel, which would dramatically increase the profitability of WPSC)
c)       They also promised a much needed capital infusion which would solve some of the liquidity problems facing the company.
 
Merger Proposal
The proposal for a WPSC shareholder is relatively simple.  We will vote our shares to support the Esmark merger.  Management just filed their final proxy to the SEC (under the merger shell “Clayton Acquisition Corp.”), and we believe the proxy should be voted on and closed by late Sept / early Oct.  Upon the close of the merger, WPSC shareholders will elect to receive ONE of the following:
a)       1 share of “New Esmark” (the merged entity, which is just WPSC with a new name)
b)       1 share of “New Esmark” and a right to purchase stock in the new co at $19
c)       The right to put your shares back to company for $20
Some more details on this, the rights offering is capped at 10.5mm shares ($200mm).  Franklin Mutual Advisers, who is the majority owner of Esmark, has entered into an agreement to backstop the rights offering, so there is no risk to this capital infusion into the company, regardless of where the stock is trading.  This capital will be used to fund the put provision at $20.  The put provision is capped at half of the shares outstanding ($150mm).  So, in effect, management will buy back half the shares outstanding @ $20 if every shareholder elects to tender their shares.  The excess capital (at least $50mm) will be used to provide liquidity to WPSC. 
 
A thorough analysis of the holders list will yield some important information.  This is a very tightly held company with the majority of shareholders being major institutional investors.
 
Holder
% sh held
Description
US Trust
14%
This is the pension for the USW Union, so we doubt they will tender
Jeffrey Gendell
13%
The principal of Tontine Capital.  He is deeply entrenched in the company’s strategic plan and we do not expect him to tender
Wellington Management
12%
Long-term investors, who could tender, but we feel they will not. 
Total Holdings
39%
 
 
Clearly, if none of the above investors tender their stock, the proration we will have on the put will be much less than 50%.  We estimate we will be able to put 70% of our stock back to the company if necessary. 
 
Please see the breakeven analysis on this investment below:
Breakeven analysis
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shares Held
100
 
 
 
Current Share Price
$16.00
 
 
 
Put Price
$20.00
 
 
 
Return to put
25.0%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proration
50%
60%
70%
80%
Shares Put
50
60
70
80
Profit on Put Shares
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
 
 
 
 
 
Remaining Shares Long
50
40
30
20
Effective Breakeven Price
$12.00
$10.00
$6.67
$0.00
 
Investment Thesis
We propose buying shares in WPSC today.  For simplicity, we will assume a $16 current stock price.  In the worst case, we will be able to put 50% (more likely 70%) of our stock back at $20.  If this case occurs, we will lock in a 24% gain on half our position.  We will then be left exposed to one of the most dynamic and fundamentally changing companies in the metals industry: New Esmark.  We estimate New Esmark to be worth at the very least, $30 per share.  Thus we see ~100% upside and a very sizable margin of safety due to the implied gain on our put provision.
 
Valuation
While we have done much more in-depth analysis of the operations, we will simplify for sake of time. 
Simple Valuation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current
 
 
 
 
Price
$16.00
 
 
 
PF Shares Out
43.4
 
 
 
Mkt Cap
693.7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash
204.7
 
 
 
Debt
452.3
 
 
 
Net Debt
247.6
 
 
 
EV
941.3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valuation
 
 
 
 
WPSC Steelmaking Capacity
3.2
 
 
 
EBITDA / ton
70.0
 
 
 
WPSC EBITDA
224.0
 
 
 
Esmark EBITDA
40.0
 
 
 
TOTAL EBITDA
264.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steel EBITDA Multiple
6.0x
 
 
 
Implied EV
1,584.0
 
 
 
Less Net Debt
247.6
 
 
 
Equity Value
1,336.4
 
 
 
Eq Value / sh
$30.82
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hidden Assets
Value
% owned
Value to WPSC (taxed)
Value per share
Wheeling Nisshin
220.0
37%
52.9
$1.22
Mountain State Carbon
500.0
50.0%
162.5
$3.75
MEE Lawsuit
82.6
100.0%
53.7
$1.24
TOTAL VALUE
 
 
269.1
$6.21
 
One way we value the company is using a steel company comp multiple of 6x EBITDA.  We use the share count PF for the merger assuming no buyback (to be conservative). 
 
It is also worth noting that WPSC has several “hidden” assets that we feel management may look to monetize (see 2Q earnings conference call Q&A).  The taxed value of all these assets is conservatively $6.21 after-tax.  For instance, the MEE lawsuit they just won was for an award of ~$215mm ($14/share of value!!!), materially more than the $82mm we give them in our analysis. 
 
 
Break-up Value
Alternatively, we have analyzed the value the company could be sold for if all operations were liquidated immediately.  Acquisition values in steel over the past 7 years have been on average $600 per ton of capacity.  Mittal just sold Sparrow’s Point for a steal at $350/ton.  Even if we severely impair the value of the steel assets and assume that they sell for $200/ton, you are still looking at a $32 NAV/share, 100% upside.  If you assume they can sell the assets for the same price Mittal just sold their mill ($350/ton), you are looking at a $67 price.  Clearly these assets are not being valued properly by the market. 
 
 
Breakup Value
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WPSC Capacity (mm tons)
3.5
 
 
 
Current EV
698.9
 
 
 
EV/ton
$200
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comp: Sparrow's Point Capacity (mm tons)
3.9
 
 
 
EV
1,350.0
 
 
 
EV/ton
$346
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steel EV/Ton Value
$200
$300
$350
$600
WPSC Steel Assets
700.0
1,050.0
1,225.0
2,100.0
 
 
 
 
 
Wheeling Nisshin
52.9
52.9
52.9
52.9
Mountain State Carbon
162.5
162.5
162.5
162.5
MEE Lawsuit
53.7
53.7
53.7
53.7
Accounts Receivable
217.9
217.9
217.9
217.9
Inventory (@ 80%)
180.3
180.3
180.3
180.3
Cash
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
Total Asset Value
1,372.0
1,722.0
1,897.0
2,772.0
 
 
 
 
 
Total Debt
452.3
452.3
452.3
452.3
 
 
 
 
 
Accounts Payable
199.6
199.6
199.6
199.6
Pension Liabilities
123.4
123.4
123.4
123.4
Payroll and Benefits Payable
40.1
40.1
40.1
40.1
Deferred Taxes
25.2
25.2
25.2
25.2
Accrued Interest
26.0
26.0
26.0
26.0
Total Liabilities
866.6
866.6
866.6
866.6
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL NAV
505.5
855.5
1,030.5
1,905.5
NAV per share
$32.97
$55.79
$67.21
$124.27
 
 
Sparrow’s Point
Here is the real kicker.  As if the prior investment thesis weren’t enough, Esmark recently won another bidding war for Sparrow’s Point (SP), a 3.9mm ton capacity steel mill which they bought from Arcelor Mittal two weeks ago.  They acquired SP with an investment partnership between CVRD, Donbass, Franklin Mutual, and other major investors.  You could not ask for better partners.  CVRD is a $100b market cap iron ore company with the best raw materials supply in the world.  Clearly, Esmark is able to do deals on a global scale, and they have a new view for WPSC/Esmark/Sparrow’s.
 
We would anticipate that the company plans to merge these two entities some time after the WPSC/Esmark merger closes.  We feel this would be an enormous positive for the company, and would serve to drive our valuation even higher, as we currently give no value to this potential combination.
 
Conclusion
Bottom line: this is the most undervalued name in the steel sector, is in the middle of a massive evolution, and has an enormous margin of safety to backstop our investment.  We feel that this should be a tier 1 sized position.   
 
 
Catalysts
(+) SEC approval of the meger proxy – Aug/Sept
 
(+) Closing of the WPSC/Esmark merger and ability to put stock at $20 – Sept/Oct
 
(+) Improved sell-side coverage and investor awareness – YE2007
 
(+) Potential for activist involvement as the company could be broken up to enhance value – YE 2007
 
(+) Spin-off or divest non-core assets (Coking Plant) – 2007/2008
 
(+) Merger of the New Esmark with Sparrow’s Point – 2008

Catalyst

(+) SEC approval of the meger proxy – Aug/Sept

(+) Closing of the WPSC/Esmark merger and ability to put stock at $20 – Sept/Oct

(+) Improved sell-side coverage and investor awareness – YE2007

(+) Potential for activist involvement as the company could be broken up to enhance value – YE 2007

(+) Spin-off or divest non-core assets (Coking Plant) – 2007/2008

(+) Merger of the New Esmark with Sparrow’s Point – 2008
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